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ABSTRACT 
 
We divide the supply chain into a central control system (CCS) case and a decentralized control 
system (DCS) case, and compare the supply chain efficiency with both the CCS case and the DCS 
case.  We find that the supply chain efficiency of a capital-intensive industry is better under the 
CCS case than under the DCS case.  Under the CCS case, the maximized supply chain efficiency 
can be reached by choosing either the lowest price that the upstream firm is willing to receive or 
the highest price that the downstream firm is willing to pay for intermediate goods. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
e introduce this section by considering the following subheadings. 
 
 
Research Aim  Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a popular approach developed by Charnes et al. (1978) to 
study the relative performance of peer decision making units (DMUs) in practice.  The application of the DEA 
model has been extended by Banker (1990), Weber and Desai (1996), Easton et al. (2002), Zhu (2003), Liang et al. 
(2006), Mu and Du (2006), Reiner and Hofmann (2006) and others to measure the relative efficiency of supply 
chain members.  The objective of this paper is to measure the relative efficiency of different types of supply chain.  
While our research is similar to that of Chen et al. (2006), it also differs from theirs in that their objective function is 
based on the ratio of outputs and inputs, whereas ours is based on a maximized profit function or a minimized cost 
function.  The objective function adopted in our paper fully reveals the spirit of game theory.  Another advantage 
of our model is that it can be used to discuss supply chain efficiency under different degrees of capital intensity.  
Finally, Semple (1996) points out that many studies which have connected game theory to the evaluation of DEA 
efficiency have been found to have limited usefulness in practice. Hence we try to apply game theory to discuss a 
practical issue regarding the evaluation of supply chain efficiency. 
 
Research Motivation  It is well known that the costs of intermediate goods has a direct impact on the prices of final 
goods.  Hence, the decision regarding the intermediate goods price has started to gain attention in the literature.  
In practice, over half of the profit is eroded by the intermediate goods cost.  In order to increase the profitability of 
a supply chain, an appropriate supply chain management model has been examined by analyzing the external market 
and a negotiating contract (Cox, 1996).  In an appropriate supply chain management model, the purchasers and the 
suppliers of the intermediate goods should communicate in an effort to decrease redundancies and increase the 
efficiency of the supply chain (Wisner and Tan, 2000).  In our paper, we establish a micro-foundation to find an 
appropriate supply chain management model. 
 
Previous Research  The first study that connected game theory to DEA efficiency estimation was that introduced 
by Banker (1990). His paper, which was basically related to the BCC version of the DEA model, was established by 
Banker et al. (1984) and was concerned with many kinds of unconstrained two-person zero-sum games.  Rousseau 
and Semple (1995) had a significant breakthrough in this field in that they constructed a new class of constrained 
two-person zero-sum games which was referred to as the Two-Person Ratio Efficiency Game (TPREG).  The 
W 
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TPREG model connects game theory to the original CCR version of the DEA model which was introduced by 
Charnes et al. (1978).  Semple (1996) further extended the TPREG model to the Constrained (Two-Person) Ratio 
Efficiency Game by including a polyhedron cone constraint in the pure strategies.  Beamon (1998) paid attention to 
the performance and design of the supply chain.  The contribution of this paper is that it provides a viewpoint 
regarding multi-stage supply chain modeling and also defines a research agenda for future research in this area.  
Kwak et al. (2006) analyzed the bargaining process in a supply chain, and developed two different supply chain 
models: one where the supplier has superior bargaining power over the buyer, and the other where the reverse case is 
true.  Nagarajan and Sosic (2008) surveyed the applications of cooperative game theory in supply chain 
management by using the cooperative bargaining game to allocate the profit between the supply chain members. 
 
DEA is a linear programming model that converts a single output and input variable or multiple output and 
input variables into a single index for estimating productivity efficiency (Epstein and Henderson, 1989).  The 
primary advantage of DEA is that it provides a composite index for an efficiency measurement, thus enabling a more 
valid comparison of supply chain efficiency.  DEA was originally utilized in non-profit fields such as in hospital 
efficiency measurement (Sherman, 1986), national park efficiency estimation (Rhodes, 1986), and non-profit 
organizations (Ahn et al. 1989).  However, DEA has been extended to the for-profit sector and private institutes.  
More specifically, Weber and Desai (1996) used DEA to set up an index for evaluating a supplier ’s relative 
performance.  Lothgren and Tambour (1999) employed a DEA-based network model and used Swedish pharmacies 
as an example to study the behavior of both producers and consumers.  Easton et al. (2002) employed a DEA 
model to compare a firm’s purchasing efficiency in the petroleum industry.  Zhu (2003) used a DEA-based model 
to investigate multiple members’ supply chain efficiency.  Castelli et al. (2004) utilized a DEA-based model to 
evaluate the DMU efficiency of a two-level hierarchical structure.  Chen et al. (2006) used the original DEA 
definition to compare two kinds of supply chain efficiency, one being a centralized control system (CCS) type of 
supply chain, and the other supply chain a decentralized control system (DCS) type.  Liang et al. (2006) used the 
DEA approach to characterize and measure the efficiency of different supply chain types when the purchase of 
intermediate goods was incorporated into the supply chain performance evaluation.  The first supply chain type that 
they treated in their paper was a leader-follower relationship between the seller and buyer, and the second one was a 
cooperative relationship.  They asserted that in the leader-follower structure, the leader was first evaluated, and 
then the follower was evaluated using the information that is revealed by the leader’s efficiency.  In the cooperative 
structure, the supply chain members are evaluated simultaneously by maximizing the joint efficiency that is modeled 
as the average efficiency scores of the seller and the buyer.  Mu and Du (2006) used the DEA model to estimate the 
efficiency of different supply chain integration projects.  The supply chain integration project that was based on 
both orderly and synthetic approaches considered both forward and reverse logistics.  Reiner and Hofmann (2006) 
combined dependency analysis and DEA to analyze supply chain performance.  They first used dependency 
analysis to determine the input and output variables, and then used the DEA approach to measure the supply chain 
performance.  Their model found evidence of a potential improvement in the estimation of basic supply chain 
efficiency. 
 
Research Approach  The concept of DEA efficiency analysis is equivalent to the best production strategy analysis 
that encourages a DMU to make progress when it competes with others.  Besides, we also introduce game theory in 
order to reveal the additional insights into practical efficiency analysis.  In this paper, we combine the concepts of 
DEA efficiency analysis and game theory in an empirical analysis. 
 
Originality of the Paper and Contribution  We find that the supply chain efficiency of a capital-intensive industry 
is better under the CCS case than under the DCS case.  Under the CCS case, the maximized supply chain efficiency 
can be reached by choosing either the lowest intermediate goods price that the upstream firm is willing to receive or 
the highest intermediate goods price that the downstream firm is willing to pay. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides the theoretical framework for this paper.  
Section 3 presents the methodology used in the paper.  Section 4 introduces the model set-up of a DEA-based 
supply chain efficiency game with two members.  Section 5 discusses supply chain efficiency under CCS and DCS,  
and provides a numerical example.  Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this paper, we combine game theory with the DEA approach in discussing the different types supply 
chain efficiency.  There are two kinds of supply chain types discussed in this paper, namely, CCS and DCS.  The 
supply chain components in our paper comprise an intermediate goods supplier (upstream firm) and a producer 
(downstream firm).  Since there is only one manager in the CCS supply chain to coordinate the operation of the 
whole supply chain, the competitive relationship between the supplier and the producer in the CCS supply chain is 
cooperative.  However, in the DCS supply chain, the supplier and the producer manage the whole supply chain by 
means of a common governance.  Hence, the relationship between the supplier and the producer in the DCS supply 
chain is competitive.  Since the CCS supply chain and the DCS supply chain have different competitive modes, we 
use game theory to describe the different competitive relationships for the different supply chain types. 
 
We view the whole supply chain as a DMU, and hence the relationship between the inputs and the outputs 
decides the performance of the DMU.  DEA is a linear programming model that converts input and output variables 
into a single index in order to estimate productivity efficiency.  We employ the DEA approach to compare the 
supply chain efficiency since it provides a single index for an efficiency measurement.  The theoretical framework 
of our paper is illustrated in Graph 1. 
 
 
Graph 1: Theoretical framework of the model 
 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
According to the theoretical framework of the model depicted in Graph 1, the theoretical sources of our 
model are game theory and the DEA approach.  In addition, based on the micro-foundation of economics, the 
supplier and the producer in the CCS supply chain decide an intermediate goods price by maximizing the joint profit.  
However, in the DCS supply chain, the intermediate goods price is decided by maximizing the individual profits of 
the supplier and the producer.  Since the different supply chain types decide the different intermediate goods prices, 
the inputs and the outputs within the supply chain are impacted differently.  At the same time, the supply chain 
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efficiency is also impacted.  Hence, we try to estimate the supply chain efficiency under the different kinds of 
supply chain.  Another primary advantage of our model is that we can estimate the supply chain efficiency under 
different degrees of capital intensity. 
 
Based on the basic concept of DEA, we view the profit of the supply chain as an output variable and the 
production cost of the supply chain as an input variable in estimating the supply chain efficiency.  Since the 
intermediate goods price may be different for the different kinds of supply chain, and the intermediate goods price 
also impacts the inputs (production cost) and the output (profit) of the supply chain, we can infer that the different 
supply chain types may also have different efficiency values. 
 
4. MODEL SET-UP 
 
Consider a supply chain composed of one upstream firm (U) and one downstream firm (D).  The 
downstream firm buys the input factor (YU) from the upstream firm and additionally uses another input factor (H) to 
transform them into the final product (YD).  We assume that the production function of a downstream firm is of the 
Cobb-Douglas form as YD = BH

YU
1-
, where   (0, 1) represents the degree of factor intensity for the downstream 
firm.  For the downstream firm, the input factor prices for H and YU are m and wB, respectively.  We assume that 
the cost function of the downstream firm has a linear form as CD = mH + wBYU.  The upstream firm has two input 
factors L and K, and their prices are w and r, respectively.  We assume that the production function of the upstream 
firm is also of the Cobb-Douglas form as YU = AL

K
1-
, where   (0, 1) represents the degree of factor intensity for 
the upstream firm.  The upstream firm also has a linear cost function as CU = wL + rK. 
 
A conflict exists between the upstream firm and downstream firm with respect to the intermediate good YU.  
If wBYU represents the upstream firm’s profit, then the upstream firm wishes to maximize it while the downstream 
firm wishes to minimize it as it represents a cost to the downstream firm.  In other words, the upstream firm and 
downstream firm compete in terms of the intermediate good price wB.  Each firm chooses the optimal amount of 
input in order to minimize cost subject to the specified output level.  The upstream firm’s minimized cost problem 
is formulated as follows: 
KL
Min
 ,
 CU = wL + rK 
subject to YU0 = AL

K
1-
,                                             (1) 
where YU0 is a specified output level. 
Similarly, the downstream firm’s minimized cost problem is formulated as follows: 
H
Min  CD = mH + wBYU 
subject to YD0 = BH

YU
1-
,                                             (2) 
where YD0 is a specified output level. 
From Equation (1), the optimal amounts of the input factors for the upstream firm are: 
L
*
 = 


  1
0
)
1
(
w
r
A
YU
, and K
*
 = 


  )
1
(
0
w
r
A
YU
.                            (3) 
From Equation (2), the optimal amounts of the input factors for the downstream firm are: 
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H
*
 = 


  1
0
)
1
(
B
D
w
m
B
Y
.                                                (4) 
Based on the concept of efficiency in Charnes et al. (1978), the efficiency for the upstream firm and the downstream 
firm are respectively defined as: 
 

rKwL
Yw UB
U
0 ,                                                     (5) 


mHYw
PY
UB
D
D
0
0 ,                                                  (6) 
where P is the market price of final goods. 
 
From the above two equations, the maximized value of U is wB  .  Similarly, the maximized value of 
D is wB  0. 
 
Given the upstream firm’s and downstream firm’s efficiency levels as asked by them, i.e., U  U
-
 and D  D
-
, we 
obtain the price interval that the upstream firm wants to charge as wB
U
  [U
-
(wL
*
+rK
*
)/YU0, ).  Similarly, the 
price that the downstream firm wants to charge wB
D
 has to satisfy the following equation: 
 
a1wB
D
 + b1 (wB
D
)
1-
 + c1  0, 
where a1 = D
-
YU0B( 
 )1( m
)
1-
 > 0, b1 = D
-
mYD0 > 0, and c1 = -PYD0 B( 
 )1( m
)
1-
 < 0.  (7) 
 
Because the upstream firm asks that the lowest efficiency level be U
-
, the upstream firm must ask that the 
lowest intermediate goods price be wB
UL
 = [U
-
(wL
*
+rK
*
)]/YU0.  On the other hand, the downstream firm’s 
maximized willingness to pay for intermediate goods is wB
DH
 for maintaining its lowest efficiency level D
-
, and 
wB
DH
 has to satisfy Equation (7).  If the game is feasible, then the reasonable relationship between wB
UL
 and wB
DH
 is 
wB
UL
  wB
DH
.  On the contrary, if wB
UL
 > wB
DH
, then the game is not feasible. 
We next define the supply chain efficiency as follows: 
S
*
 = 
Bw
Max {S = (wBYU0+PYD0)/(wL
*
+rK
*
+wBYU0+mH
*
(wB)):  U > 0, D > 0}.    (8) 
The above definition shows that supply chain efficiency depends on the decision for the intermediate goods price.  
From the first-order condition, the intermediate goods price is wB
*
.
1
  However, wB
*
 violates the second-order 
condition.  Thus, the optimal intermediate goods price is a corner solution. 
 
5. CENTRAL CONTROL SYSTEM AND DECENTRALIZED CONTROL SYSTEM 
 
The CCS and DCS are two kinds of management modes in a supply chain.  In this section we compare 
supply chain efficiency under two kinds of supply chain management modes. 
                                                 
1 The intermediate goods wB
* and wB
* satisfy a2wB
* - b2(wB
*) - c2 = 0, where a2 = 



 11
00
)(mB
YmY UD
 > 0, b2 = (PYD0 - wL
* - rK*)YU0, 
and c2 = 





11
2
0
)(
)1(
mB
PYm D
 > 0. 
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5.1  CENTRAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
 
In a central control system (CCS), there is a single decision maker who assigns the upstream firm and the 
downstream firm efficiencies for maximizing supply chain efficiency.  However, if the downstream firm cannot 
realize its own minimum acceptable efficiency level D
-
, then it will not agree to set up a supply chain with the 
upstream firm.  Similarly, if the upstream firm cannot realize its own minimum acceptable efficiency level U
-
, then 
it will also not agree to set up a supply chain with the downstream firm.  Thus the central manager chooses the 
optimal intermediate price to maximize supply chain efficiency, and to satisfy the upstream firm’s and downstream 
firm’s efficiency values as asked by themselves.  Thus, according to Equation (8) the optimal supply chain 
efficiency can be expressed as: 
 
SCCS
*
 = Max{S(wB
UL
), S(wB
DH
):  U  U
-
, D  D
-
, and wB
UL
  wB
DH
}.   (9) 
 
Proposition:  To maximize the supply chain efficiency in the CCS case, the central manager chooses either the 
upstream firm’s lowest willingness to receive the price (wB
UL
) or the downstream firm’s highest willingness to pay 
(wB
DH
) as the intermediate goods price.  This decision is based on the shape of the supply chain efficiency function 
with the CCS case (i.e., s). 
 
5.2  DECENTRALIZED CONTROL SYSTEM 
 
In a decentralized control system (DCS), the upstream firm and the downstream firm control their own 
efficiency.  In other words, both of them make efforts to maximize their own efficiency.  Because the intermediate 
good is the upstream firm’s profit and downstream firm’s cost, the upstream firm or the downstream firm has to 
minimize the opponent’s efficiency.  Thus, a bargaining model is used to examine the efficiency conflict between 
the upstream firm and the downstream firm. 
 
The bargaining process with infinite periods is as depicted by Figure 1.  Shaked and Sutton (1984) showed 
that the solution for the bargaining process with infinite periods is the same as the solution for the sub-game 
bargaining process beginning with the third period.  Thus, the bargaining process with infinite periods can be 
translated into a bargaining process with three periods as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Graph 1: A bargaining process with infinite periods 
 
Graph 2: A bargaining process with three periods 
U D
Suggestion
S
1
Reject
Accept
(U1, D1)
U
Suggestion
S
2
Accept
Reject
Suggestion
S
3 D
Accept
(dU
2U
*, dD
2D
*)(dUU2, dDD2)
The First Period The Second Period The Third Period
Reject
Suggestion
S
4 U
Unconditionally
Accept
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2010 Volume 26, Number 6 
109 
Based on Shaked and Sutton (1984), if the upstream firm’s suggestion (S3) in the second period cannot be 
accepted by the downstream firm, then it will accept any suggestion provided by the downstream firm in the third 
period unconditionally.  Consider a bargaining game with three periods as shown in Figure 2.  The bargaining 
process begins with suggestion 1 (S1) provided by the upstream firm (U).  The downstream firm (D) makes a 
decision of either acceptance or rejection.  If the downstream firm accepts S1, then the game is over at the 
efficiency pair (U1, D1).  The former efficiency pair (U1, D1) is the efficiency value of the upstream firm and the 
latter is the efficiency value of the downstream firm.  If the downstream firm rejects S1, then the downstream firm 
sets a new suggestion 2 (S2).  The upstream firm makes a decision for either acceptance or rejection.  The game 
does not end until one member of the supply chain accepts another member’s suggestion. 
 
Because the upstream firm and downstream firm incur some bargaining cost in the bargaining process, the 
time value is considered in this model.  Assume the upstream firm’s and the downstream firm’s discount rates are 
dU and dD, respectively, where 0 < dU < 1 and 0 < dD < 1.  If the agreement happened in the ith period with 
suggestion (Si), then the real efficiency pair for the upstream firm and downstream firm is (dU
i-1Ui, dD
i-1Di).  In a 
bargaining game with infinite periods, if i  , then (dU
i-1Ui, dD
i-1Di)  (0, 0). 
 
Assume that the optimal solution for the bargaining game with three periods in the third period is (U
*
, D
*
).  
According to Shaked and Sutton (1984), the upstream firm has to unconditionally accept any suggestion from the 
downstream firm during the third period. It is thus ideal for the upstream firm to accept suggestion 2 (S2) provided 
by the downstream firm.  However, suggestion 2 (S2) should satisfy dUU2 = dU
2U
*
 and D
*
 = dDD2.  It can be 
said that if U2 = dUU
*
 and D
*
 = dDD2, then (U
*
, D
*
) is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium and satisfies (i) D
*
 
= ED(U
*
); (ii) D2 = ED(U2), i.e., (1/dD)D
*
 = ED(dUU
*
).
2
  Using the Nash equilibrium condition to estimate the 
optimal intermediate good price for the DCS case (wB
DCS
) means that wB
DCS
 has to satisfy the following equation: 
 
a3(wB
DCS
)
2
 + b3(wB
DCS
)
2-
 - c3 = 0, where 
a3 = 1, b3 = (
0
0
U
D
BY
Ym
)( 
1
)
1-
 > 0, c3 = 2
0
**
0 )(
UUD
D
Ydd
rKwLPY 
 > 0.                  (10) 
Thus, the supply chain efficiency under the decentralized control system (DCS) case can be summarized as: 
SDCS
*
 = S(wB
DCS
).                                                  (11) 
 
5.3  NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
 
Suppose there are 9 types of downstream firm, i.e.,  = 0.1, 0.2,…, 0.9.  The production functions of the 
upstream firm and downstream firm are YU = L
0.2
K
0.8
 and YD = 3H

YU
1-
, respectively.  Obviously, the upstream 
firm is a capital-intensive firm such as a bank.  However, the factor intensity of the downstream firm is not 
necessary.  If  is low, then there is a close relationship between the upstream firm and the downstream firm like 
that for a bank and an insurance corporation under the same financial holding company.  On the contrary, if  is 
high, then there is a distant relationship between them.  The relationship is like that between an independent bank 
and an independent insurance company that are connected by a cooperative contract.  We also assume that the 
                                                 
2 The upstream firm accepts suggestion 2 (S2) provided by the downstream firm and the efficiency values for the upstream firm 
and downstream firm are dUU2 and dDU2, respectively.  Because suggestion 2 (S2) is provided by the downstream firm, the 
efficiency value of the downstream firm has to satisfy dDD2 = D
*.  If suggestion 2 (S2) is accepted by the upstream firm, then 
the efficiency values of the upstream firm should be indifferent between suggestion 2 (S2) and suggestion 3 (S3), i.e., dUU2 = 
dUU
*.  By dDD2 = D
*, we obtain D2 = (1/dD)D
*, and ED(dUU2) = ED(dUU
*) = D2.  Thus, we obtain (1/dD)D
* = ED(dUU
*).  
This implies that the downstream firm will seek a maximized conditional efficiency ED(dUU
*) under the condition that the 
upstream firm’s efficiency is equal to dUU
*. 
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factor prices of L, K, and H are 1, i.e., w = r = m = 1, and that the price of final goods is 10, i.e., P = 10.  The 
outputs of the upstream firm and downstream firm are 10 and 100, respectively.  When the upstream firm and 
downstream firm become a supply chain, the lowest efficiency values which are asked by the upstream firm and 
downstream firm are 5, i.e., U
-
 = D
-
 = 5.  Since both of them have the same time cost, we assume that dU and dD 
are equal to 0.5.  The numerical results are as follows: 
 
 
Table 1: Supply Chain Efficiency Scores for the CCS and DCS Cases 
Supply Chain Type 
CCS DCS 
wB
CCS (= wB
UL = wB
DH) SCCS
* wB
DCS SDCS
* 
 = 0.1 8.247 8.341 22.202 3.896 
 = 0.2 8.247 6.833 20.292 3.521 
 = 0.3 8.247 6.026 19.378 3.344 
 = 0.4 8.247 5.648 None None 
 = 0.5 8.247 5.560 19.376 3.344 
 = 0.6 8.247 5.693 19.998 3.464 
 = 0.7 8.247 6.017 20.888 3.637 
 = 0.8 8.247 6.519 None None 
 = 0.9 8.247 7.205 23.001 4.055 
 
 
In Table 1, “None” means that the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium does not exist.  We summarize 
some of the findings from Table 1 by pointing out that the supply chain efficiency for the CCS case is superior to the 
supply chain efficiency for the DCS case.  The price of intermediate goods for the CCS case is always lower than 
the price of intermediate goods for the DCS case.  It is also shown that supply chain efficiency is always higher 
under the CCS case than under the DCS case.  However, the price of intermediate goods from the bargaining 
process is always high and a high intermediate goods price creates low supply chain efficiency.  The bargaining 
process sometimes does not have a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.  On the contrary, it is of benefit to the 
capital-intensive industry to form a supply chain with CCS.  Thus, many financial holding companies have been 
established in Taiwan. 
 
5.4  DISCUSSION 
 
In the above subsection, we provide a numerical example to explain a phenomenon in Taiwan that different 
financial institutions, such as banks, securities companies and insurance companies, merge with each other to 
become a financial supply chain, such as a financial holding company.  In our numerical example, we let the 
upstream firm be a capital-intensive firm and the downstream firm be either a capital-intensive firm ( is small) or a 
non-capital-intensive firm ( is large).  Since we focus on how the supply chain type and capital intensity influence 
the supply chain’s efficiency, we let the other numerical settings in our example be equal.  Hence, our numerical 
setting fits the model’s assumptions and the research objectives. 
 
Our analytic result shows that the capital intensity supply chain should adopt the CCS management model.  
It can be inferred from this conclusion that, under the merger policy, the banks, the securities companies and the 
insurance companies should form a financial holding company.  The findings in this paper can explain the 
phenomenon of the financial market in Taiwan.  Hence, our theoretical framework and numerical example are 
consistent with real phenomena. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Past studies which connect game theory to the DEA-based efficiency model have been limited in their 
usefulness when estimating efficiency.  The current study follows the basic definition of the CCR version of the 
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DEA model in evaluating supply chain efficiency with two members under both a centralized control system and 
decentralized control system.  More specifically, we discuss the impact on supply chain efficiency with respect to 
the difference in factor intensity.  Because the upstream firm within a supply chain produces intermediate goods as 
the input of the downstream firm in another supply chain, they are in conflict with each other when it comes to 
measuring the price of the intermediate goods.  In other words, the reason for the conflict is that the upstream firm 
seeks to maximize profit and the downstream firm seeks to minimize cost.  It is shown that the optimal 
intermediate goods’ price is decided by either the upstream firm or the downstream firm under a centralized control 
system.  The intermediate goods’ price under a centralized control system is lower than that under a decentralized 
control system.  Supply chain efficiency under a centralized control system is higher than that under a decentralized 
control system.  Finally, the central manager can maximize supply chain efficiency by choosing either the upstream 
firm’s lowest degree of willingness to receive the price or the downstream firm’s highest degree of willingness to 
pay the intermediate goods price. 
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